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irst, Enron. Then Arthur Ander-
sen We all look for lessons in
these spectacular flame-outs.
Andersen partners and former part-
ners are in a similar position as they ask
questions and agonize over how the
firms collapse will affect them individu-
ally Current partners know that they
wiil probably never see a cent from their
capital contributions to the firm. Retired
partners anxiously wonder whether
their $500 million in retirement
accounts vill be protected or used to
pay creditors and claimants.
With Andersen already facing more
than $1 billion in claims and insurance
coverage estimated to be only $300 mil-
lion, the most looming concern for for-
mer and current partners of Andersen is
whether they may be held personally
liable for Andersen debts and claims,
According to the Wall StreetJotirnal
(on April 2, 2002), many Andersen
partners who had "nothing to do with
the firm's work for Enron" are seeking
legal advice because they fear personal
liability for the Enron-related claims.
In considering partners' personal lia-
bility exposure, some believe that the
good news may be that Andersen reor-
ganized as a limited liability partner-
ship. At the same time, the bad news is
that Andersen is registered as an Illinois
limited liability partnership and that
nationwide, the LLP structure is largely
untested. Even ira pannership satisfies
the statutory requirements for LLP sta-
tus, plaintiffs could attack the LLP
shield or try to plead around the shield.
For claims against lawyers, courts may
exercise their inherent power to regulate
the legal profession, refusing to allow
lawyers it limit their vicarious liahility.
Courts must also answer questions
related to interstate practice and conflict
of law issues.
Despite the uncertamty surrounding
professionals practicing in limited liabil-
ity firms, the claims against Andersen
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and the law firms that represented
Enron have renewed interest in profes-
sionals practicing as L1.Ps. Firms that
have not previously converted to LIPs
are now considering doing so.
Before rushing to jump on the iLP
bandwagon, this article urges firm man-
agers to consider the various negative
consequences of professionals practic-
ing as an LLP Using information
gleaned from the Andersen-Enron expe-
rience, we'll discuss the possible traps of
practicing as an LLP and identify some
developments and challenges to watch
for itt the cases against the accounting
and law partners who represented
Enron.
This discussion should help firm
partners realize that conversion to an
LLP is no panacea, but a relatively new
organizational structure that may create
new problems arid predicaments for
practicing professionals and persons
who rely on their work and solvency
The situation the Andersen partners
and former partners (collectively called
Andersen partners) currently face is the
very type of catastrophe that the LLP
structure was intended to address -
the risk of personal liability when rhe
firm's assets and insurance are wholly
inadequate to satisfy claims.
To address this risk, Texas lawyers in
1991 proposed the nation's first I.LP
legislation, enabling firms to continue to
function as general partnerships while
limiting partners' vicariotis liability for
malpractice. Following the adoption of
LLP legislation in Texas, accountants
and lawyers aggressively pushed other
state legislatures to adopt iLP statutes.
Now every state has modified its part-
nership laws, permitting general part-
nerships to register as LLPs.
The actual protection for LIP part-
ners varies from state to state. For charts
and comnentary on state variations, see
Alan R. Bromberg & lharry E. Ribsicin.
Unilted Liability Partnerships and dte
Revised Uniform Partnershlip Act (2001
edition), Chapter 3. Most statutes now
inmit vtcarious liability for all partner-
ship debts and obligations ("full shield"
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protection.). In some states, including
Illinois, the liability shield only limits a
partner's vicarious liability for claims
based on negligence or misconduct of
some partnership agent ("partial shield"
pntection).
Under full and partial shield statutes,
partners remain liable for their own
negligence, wrongful acts arid iniscon-
duct. Most LLI' statutes also provide
some degree of personal liability for
supervisory partners. As explained
below, the differences in the statutory
liability shield can affect both zhe
dynamics of firm practice and tle han-
tIling of claims.
Conceptually, the general partner-
ship principle of "all for one, one for
all," encouraged fin partners to active-
ly participate in firm affairs and man-
agement. General partners with unlimit-
ed liability should be willing, indeed
eager to devote time and resources to
monitoring and risk management activi-
ties that promise to reduce their person-
al liability exposure. Conversion to an
LLP undercuts this incentive in two
ways. First, it eliminates unlimited lia-
bility as an economic incentive to
devote time arid resources to tnonitor-
ing the conduct of firm players. Second,
the LLP statutes that impose superviso-
ry liability actually create a disincentive,
undermining partners' willingness to
participate in firm management and
supervisory activities.
As an LLP partner with no vicarious
liability exposure, why should such a
partner get involved in firm manage-
ment and supervision if those activities
will expose the person's assets? is the
desire to protect the firm's reputation
and assets enough to risk personal lia-
bility exposure?
When I was a firn partner specializ-
ing in legal malpractice work. I took an
active role in firm management and
supervision. As a matter of professional
responsibility risk avoidance and good
business, I supported the investment in
monitoring and supervdsion activities to
protect clients, as well as the firms
assets, reputation and partners. Now,
DaPJ47
senior lawyers may he more inclined to
shirk supervisory responsibilities when
LLP status eliminates vicarious liability,
content rating liability on individtual
tortfeasors and supervisors.
To address tile liability exposure ol
supt'rvisors, firms should carry ade-
quate malpractice coverage. Another
approach to providing supervisors some
level of comfort would be for firm part-
ners to agree to indemnify managers
and supervisors for losses they sulfer for
serving as managers and supervisors,
Without indemnification or insurance
protection, risk-averse partners may
avoid supervision and management
activities.
The reluctance of risk-averse part-
iers to get involved in supervision and
An Enron-related class action sug-
gests how far sophisticated plaintiffs'
counsel might seek to extend superviso-
ry liability In addition to naming
Andersen partners who were an "inte-
gral part of the Enron audit and con-
suiting engagernent," the complaint
names country and regional managing
partners of Andersen and Andersen-
related entities. In re Enron Securities Lit-
Igation, Complaint, U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Cv.
1I-01-3624 (April 8, 2002).
While the complaint identifies four
Andersen partners as "control persons"
for purposes of the federal securities
acts, their managerial involvement may
expose them to liability if they had
"direct supervision and control" as
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management is exacerbated by the fail-
ure of the LLP statutes to define clearly
the degree and nature ol control that
will subject a stpervisor or manager to
personal.liability. Although most
statutes hold supervisors liable Ibr per-
sons under their direct supervisionrand
control, the statutes provide little guid-
ance on precisely when a partner
should be considered a supervisor.
Is a supervisor strictly liable for acts
and omissions of subordinates or must
a plaintiff establish negligence in super-
vision? Would membership on an opin-
ion committee or service as a section
leader be enough to expose a partner to
personal liability if that partner had no,
direct involvenent in the alleged mal-
practice*'
Professor Alan R. Brombergs Com-
nerits following tile 1991 Texas LI_1
amendments explain that questions of
supervisory control liability "involve fact
questions as well as interpretation of tire
SttRtUory hingttage." Tex. Rev Civil Star.
Ann. Art. 6132b § 15 crts, (1991
expired). Malpractice plaintiffs' lawyers
will attemrpt to raise [lact questions on
the responsibility of all firm partners
connected with the representation.
required by the Illinois LLP statute. If
Andersen supervisors are held personal-
ly liable, LLP partners around the coun-
try will be even more reluctant to serve
as managers and supervisors.
Andersens status as an Illinois IlP
also illustrates the problems created
when professional firs eliminate the
"all for one, one for all" relationship in
which all partners share unlimited lia-
bility for all partnership debts. The
LLPs elimination of unlimited liability
lor all debts can create serious conlicts
relating to sharing of liability and pay-
ment of debts.
When tie firm does not carry suffi-
cient insurance to pay malpractice
claims, those partners with personal
exposure will lobby for firm assets to be
devoted to pay the malpractice clait.
Contrarily, other partners will push for
firm assets to be used to pay general
firnt debts such bank loans and other
dcbs li r whih partners have petsonal
liability.
This conflict becomes particularly
actie when the partnerslhip is registered
under an 1.1P "partial shield" stature
such as the one in Illinois. tecause the
Illinois statute only limits liability for
misconduct-type claims, partners in an
Illinois LLP can still be personally liable
for contract obligations such as those
relating to the firnms lease and line of
credit. As a result, Andersen partners
may remain personally liable for con-
tractual obligations after they leave the
finn.
"wo former partners of Keck, Mahin
& Cate, an Illinois general partnership,
believed that they could escape liability
for Keck debts by switching law firms.
Following the bankruptcy of the law
finn, former Keck partners had tie
opt ion to pay between $5,000 and
$10,000 to settle claims against them
under the finn bankruptcy plan. After
Barbara P Billauer and Thomas E.
Ilo'okano declined to participate in the
settlement, they were sued for claims
exceeding $9 milliori. Billatrer and
HoIokano denied liability, asserting that
the claims were not in existence when
they withdrew frot tire partnership.
A bankruptcy judge for the Northern
District of Illinois rejected the former
partners' arguments, finding the part-
ners jointly and severally liable for more
than $3.7 million, including S1.6 mil-
lion in malpractice claims. As stated by
the judge in a March 6, 2002, opinion,
a partner cannot escape liabiliry simply
by leaving the partnership after the mal-
practice is committed but before the
client wins or settles a malpractice
claim." Kec. Malhin & Cae v Billatier;
274 B.R. 740 (Mankr. N.D. IL. 2002).
The clear message From the bankruptcy
judge was thai a zrpatiierw change of
address does not mratter because a part-
ner remains liable for matters pending
at the time of dissolution. The Keck
decision should concern Andersen part-
ners who believed that they could
escape the Enron nightnae by switch-
ing Iirms.
The exodus of Andersen partners
and practice groups is another negative
consequence of the LLP structure.
Andersen's U.S. payroll has dwindled
from 28,000 to 1,000 and its worldwide
staff of approximiately 85,000 has been
similarly decimated. I-cc Hackstader,
"Andersen Hit with Maximum Penalty;
judge Fines Firm $500,000, I'uts It on
Probation," The ,Itshimglont Post, Oct.
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17, 2002. Rather than jumping ship,
Andersen partners might have been
more committed to rebuild the firm had
they believed that they were personally
on the hook for Enron claims. Why
remain with a crippled firm and have
your future accounts tapped when you
have no personal liability?
Consider the response of account-
ants and lawyers sued by saving and
loan regulators. Law finn partners at
Kaye, Scholcr, Fierman, Hayes and
Handler, as well as other firuis, stuck
with their partnerships. To settle the
government claims, Kaye Scholer part-
ners agreed personally to pay $16 mil-
lion. If Kaye Scholer partners had limit-
ed liability, they might have been more
inclined to find another firm home
rather than paying the claims our of
future revenue.
Lawyers, more than accountants,
enjoy a great deal of mohility in theory
because courts typically do not enforce
restrictive agreements that violate
lawyer ethics rules. LLP law partners
with portable business have little incen-
tive to stick with a firm facing large
claims. On the other hand, general part-
ners will be more committed to firms
w,.hen they share personal liability.
Committed partners who share
unlimited liability should be interested
in carrying adequate levels of insurance
and devoting commensurate resources
to risk management. Conversion to aln
iLP firm can affect the firm's purchase
of insurance if partners no longer worry
about vicarious liability exposure and
carry lower limits of liability Andersen's
$300 million in malpractice liability
coverage appears woefully inadequate
given Andersen's exposure and $4 bil-
lion in revenues in 2001.
At insurance renewal time, the LIP
structure can also create conflicts
between partners. Those LLP partners
who believe that they have a limited lia-
bihty shield may prefer to carry policies
with lower limits of liability than they
would carry if their firnns operated as
traditional partnerships in which part-
ners shared personal liability On the
other hand, LLP partners with more
personal exposure because of the nature
of their practices and firm responsihili-
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ties will prefer that the firm carry higher
limits. With the costs of malpractice
insurance significantly increasing, part-
ners who lobby for lower limits may
prevail.
The limited liability structure can
also affect the adjustment ofclaims
made under professional liability poli-
cies. Unlike the traditional partnership
in which all partners are aligned in
sharing unlimited liability, partners in
an LLP sit in different positions. Those
part ners involved in the representation
share personal liability, while other part-
nets will try to stand behind the LLP lia-
bility shield. Possible conflicts between
sued partners can also result in cross-
claims, requiring separate counsel.
Assuming that the policy requires that
defense costs lie deducted from the limn-
its of liability, these additional defense
costs will further drain the amount avail-
able to pay judgment and settlements.
The LIP structure can create con-
flicts and other problems within firms
that affect both firm stability and rela-
tionships. From the perspective of
clients and the public, the most serious
consequence of the LLP structure may
be asset insufficiency. Asset insufficiency
occurs when the assets of the finn and
the tortfeasors fall short of the amount
necessary to satisfy cieditors' claims.
This is a real risk with thinly capitalized
firms in which partners minimize their
investments in the firm and rely on debt
financing, Following a large judgment,
firm panners who are not personally
liable could seek to dissolve the defen-
dant firm and relocate.
To the extent that firm property is
collateral for secured creditors' claims, it
will be unavailable to tort victims both
in and outside of bankruptcy. Once the
firm is in bankruptcy, the court will give
secured creditors priority over tort vic-
tints. This leaves the tort victim holding
a judgment against the bankrupt law
firm and the indtvidual torifeasors
This brings us to the billion-dollar
question - would the Andersen col-
lapse have happened if Andersen were a
traditional partnership? While Ander-
sen's obstruction of justice conviction
sounded Andersen's death knell as a
fhill-serVce atuditing powerhouse, we
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are left wondering about the deleterious
effects of Andersen functioning as an
LLP. Would Andersen partners have
elected to carry higher levels of insur-
ance if they were exposed to vicarious
liability? Would Andersen paruiers with
vicarious liability have been more
inclined to scrutinize risky Enron trans-
actions rather than take the $52 million
in annual revenue from Enron?
As suggested by two scholars, limited
liability creates a moral hazard by allow-
ing participants to map the benefits of
risky activities and not bear all of the
costs. Frank 1-. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fishel, "Limited Liability and the Cor-
poration," 52 Chicago law Reviev 89,
103-04 (1985).
These questions should spur firms to
evaluate carefully the advisability of
operating as ILPs. Legislators should
revisit statutory minimum insurance
requirements. Rather than using a "one
size fits all approach" requiring that LLP
firms carry a specified amount of insur-
ance, a modest modification would be
to require that insunnce be based on
the number of firm partners or revenue.
Ten years after adoption of the first
LLP statutory provisions, we should
seriously consider if the adoption of
LLP legislation was a misguided reac-
tion to the malpractice claims brought
by government regulators:-Now with
the failure of Arthur Andersen, we are
left re-evaluating whether the public,
and even firm partners, would have
been better served had firms invested
in monitoring, insurance and risk
management, rather than relying on
the untested LLP shield.
In October, 2002,Joe Berardinu,
former chief executive officer of Ander-
sen, participated in a panel discussion
at Georgetown University. In dis-
cussing the failure of companies like
Enron and WorldCom. he concluded
by saying, "I think that the future is
full of promise fbr those who heed the
lessons and mistakes of the past."
Georgetown University Wire, Oct. 22,
2002.
Identifying lessons from the col-
lapse of Andersen gives professionals
an opportuaity to address problems cre-
ated by practicing in LLPs. 
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